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   The global financial crisis is a watershed event that calls for a reexamination of the global 
financial architecture.  In this paper we focus on one aspect of this re-evaluation: the implications 
of the crisis on emerging markets (EMs) use of precautionary measures aiming at mitigating their 
exposure to financial crises.  The global liquidity crisis renewed the debate about the desirability 
of unfettered financial integration of developing countries.  It also raises questions about the 
degree to which hoarding a large stockpile of international reserves (IR) suffices to deal with the 
financial exposure of EMs in an efficient way.  We overview this debate, and assess possible 
future options.   
In Section 1 we discuss the degree to which IR provided self-insurance to EMs during the 
deleveraging crisis of 2008-9, pointing out that the record is mixed.  Half of the EMs depleted 
not more than a 1/3 of their initial stocks of IR, and the other half adjusted mostly by 
depreciation, with small changes of their IR.  Several EMs found that initial large IR war-chests 
were not enough to prevent runs on IR and large depreciations; runs that were abated in some 
countries only with the proliferation of deep swaps lines.  This raises a concern about the 
desirability and the efficacy of hoarding a large stock of IR as a mean of self-insurance.  In 
section 2 we outline the case for supplementing hoarding IR with a tax on external borrowing, 
and a subsidy for hoarding IR.  We describe a model of an emerging market where entrepreneurs 
finance investment via bank intermediation of foreign borrowing.  Such bank intermediation 
exposes the economy to the risk of a sudden stop and deleveraging crisis that may induce costly 
premature liquidation of tangible investment.  Hoarding IR mitigates this risk.  We show that the 
optimal allocation involves a tax on external borrowing, and a subsidy on hoarding IR.   
Our proposed tax scheme is akin to a borrowing tax in the presence of costly sovereign 
default and moral hazard [see Aizenman and Turnovsky (2002)].  That paper studied costly 
financial intermediation between lenders and emerging markets in the presence of sovereign risk. 
Moral hazard was modeled on the lender side, due to the 'Too-Big-to-Fail' doctrine - large 
defaults of major banks are destabilizing, hence agents expect public bailout for large defaults. 
Aizenman and Turnovsky (2002) showed that moral hazard subsidizes sovereign debt, 
magnifying considerably the distortions associated with external borrowing. This magnification 
effect is large enough to imply that, starting with no active reserve requirement policy, both 
lenders and borrowers would benefit by imposing reserve requirements. Hence, the proliferation   2
of the 'too big to fail' doctrine strengthens considerably the case for prudent regulations of 
sovereign borrowing.    
The contribution of the present paper is to show that a Pigovian tax-cum-subsidy is 
optimal even in the absence of moral hazard triggered by sovereign risk and expected bailouts. 
The logic of this Pigovian tax-cum-subsidy scheme follows from the negative externalities 
associated with large inflows of capital.  If reserves are not plentiful, a deleveraging crisis 
induces a large number of banks to liquidate investments at the same time.  This would depress 
the selling price of tangible capital, increasing the cost of deleveraging -- the fire-sale effect.  
Large deleveraging in emerging markets increases the demand for foreign currency.  If foreign 
currency reserves are limited, the deleveraging pressure would bid up the price of foreign 
currency, requiring each bank to liquidate more of its investment to fund a given deleveraging 
pressure.  While each bank takes potential fire-sale prices as given, taken together, their actions 
as a group induce the fire-sale prices.  This leads to a fire-sale externality, akin to congestion [see 
Krugman (2000) on the experience of Korea in the 1997-8 crisis].   
We show in section 2 that the fire-sale externality reduces the marginal social benefit of 
borrowing below the private benefit, and increases the marginal social benefit of hoarding IR 
above the private one.  The optimal tax-cum-subsidy scheme reduces the distorted activity 
(external borrowing), inducing the borrowers to co-finance the precautionary hoarding of IR by 
means of the borrowing tax.  Such a scheme may mitigate some of the recent concerns dealing 
with the costs of hoarding and using IR for self-insurance purposes.  In section 3 we close the 
paper with a discussion. 
The contribution of this paper is in identifying the impact of the fire-sale externalities on 
the external borrowing policies and hoarding reserves enacted by the EMs’ central banks.
1  Fire-
sale externalities in baking in a closed economy were studied by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), 
and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) in international finance.   The use of Pigovian schemes 
to deal with financial externalities has been recognized by the literature propagated by the global 
crisis of 2008-9, exemplified by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009).  Korinek (2009) identified the 
                                                 
1  The estimated ‘fire-sale discounts’ for equities and real estate are in the range of 10% (equities) and 
15% (real estate) [see Coval and Stafford (2007), Pennington-Cross (2006) and Clauretie
 and  Daneshvary 
(2009)]. These studies focused on the US.  The fire-sale discounts may be even higher in less liquid 
markets, as may be the case in Emerging Markets during deleveraging crises.      3
undervaluation by individual agents of the social benefits of liquidity as an externality, inducing 
investors to take on too much systemic risk in their financing and investment decisions.  Bianchi 
and Mendoza (2010) studied overborrowing and financial crises in business cycles and asset 
prices with collateral constraints, where private agents do not internalize the effects of their 
individual borrowing plans on the market price of assets at which collateral is valued, and on the 
wage costs relevant for working capital financing. They inferred that a state-contingent tax on 
debt of about 1 percent, on average, supports optimality.  As is exemplified by Benigno et al. 
(2010) and the references therein, borrowing constraints by themselves have ambiguous 
implications regarding over or under borrowing, depending on the parameterization and the 
structure of the economy.
2  Bianchi (2010) and Korinek (2010) studied the way capital flow 
volatility can trigger feedback cycles that work through the depreciation of the real exchange 
rate.   
Jeanne and Korinek (2010) studied similar amplifications in an open economy.  They 
found that when financial constraints are binding, financial amplification effects arise as 
declining collateral values, tightening financial constraints and falling consumption mutually 
reinforce each other.  Such amplification effects are not internalized by individual borrowers and 
provide a natural rationale for taxation of international borrowing.  Our paper shares the spirit of 
Jeanne and Korinek (2010), focusing on the adverse welfare effects of fire-sale externalities 
triggered by a deleveraging crisis.  The bourgeoning recent literature implies several mechanisms 
at work, needing more empirical research to quantify the importance of these factors.  The 
revealed preferences of Emerging Markets’ central banks in the aftermath of the 2008-9 global 
crisis has been that taxing surges in external borrowing of domestic banks is a discretionary tool 
supporting prudential supervision.  This sentiment is reflected in the recent recommendation of 
Hyun Song Shin, advising South Korea’s government, “…it should tax the wholesale liabilities 
of the country’s banks. Whenever a South Korean bank wants to expand its loan book faster than 
its retail deposits, it relies on foreign borrowing to fill the gap. So a levy on these extra liabilities 
                                                 
2  They show that overborrowing can occur under special circumstances, including large shocks and 
impatient agents, but this result is model and parameter dependent.  They conclude that there is no clear 
cut rationale to prefer ex ante or ex-post policies to minimize the likelihood or the severity of financial 
crises.   4
would serve to limit banks’ borrowing abroad.”
3  Our paper provides a cost benefit rationale for 
this position. 
 
1.   IR as self-insurance during a crisis: the crisis experience of EMs 
The experience of Korea during the last fifteen years outlines the contours of the debate 
about self-insurance by means of hoarding reserves.  To recall, following the 1997-8 East Asian 
crisis, Korea embraced financial integration, buffered with large hoarding of international 
reserves.  The large stock of IR provided Korean authorities with precautionary saving to 
cushion against sudden stops and deleveraging.  Figure 1 provides an overview of these trends 
(1992-2008), tracing the short run and long run external debt to GDP ratios, share of foreign 
ownership of equities of firms listed on the Korean stock market, and the IR/GDP ratio in Korea.  
Korean’s financial integration started gradually in the early 1990s and accelerated in the 
aftermath of the East Asian crisis.  The integration process led to rapid increase in foreign 
ownership share of Korean stock market, from less than 5% in 1992 to more than 40% in 2004.  
IR/GDP hovered around 5% before the 1997-8 crisis. However, the financial upheaval triggered 
by the crisis induced a major change in Korea’s IR hoarding policy. By 2004, IR reached more 
than 25% of Korean GDP, exceeded twice Korea’s short term external debt, and were greater 
than Korea’s total external debt.
4  Korea’s reserves in 2004 covered more than half a year of its 
imports, well above the yardstick for IR used during the Bretton Woods period.
5  
                                                 
3 See The Economist, November 11, 2010 over-viewing Shin’s position in the context of the challenges 
facing EMs in times of large inflows of foreign capital chasing domestic yields.   
 
4 I am grateful to Yeonho Lee for sharing the data.  See Aizenman, Lee and Rhee (2007), where we show 
that the 1997-8 crisis led to structural changes in the hoarding of Korea’s IR.  The Korean monetary 
authority seemed to give much greater attention to a broader notion of ‘hot money,’ inclusive of short-
term debt and foreigners' shareholding.  See Jeong (2009) for a detailed overview explaining the external 
borrowing of Korea during the years prior to the 2007-8 crisis.  Jeong points out that “…foreign bank 
branches in Korea are not subject to the supervision of their management of foreign exchange liquidity (as 
are domestic banks), despite the fact that foreign branches in Korea account for a high share of the 
country’s short-term foreign debt or foreign debt of banks.”  This regulatory gap induced regulatory 
arbitrage, where foreign bank branches in Korea probably overlooked the social cost of external 
borrowing.   Adopting the optimal policy derived in this paper would close this regulatory gap.  
5  While focusing on IR/GDP instead of IR/Imports is arbitrary, it allows for comparison overtime during 
decades when financial factors gained importance in explaining the patterns of hoarding IR.  Prior to the 
financial integration, the demand for reserves provided self-insurance against volatile trade flows.   5
Less than ten years after the 1997-8 East Asian crisis, Korea’s IR/GDP seemed to be 
more than adequate using conventional yardsticks -- IR that exceeded short term debt, allowing 
financing several quarters of imports.
6 Following the sizable increase in Korea’s external debt 
after 2005, this sense of possible abundance of IR in Korea evaporated.  The Korean external 
short term debt/GDP ratio increased from 7.5% in 2004 to 20% in 2008, the overall external 
debt/GDP increased during that period from 23% to 50%, without a significant change in the 
IR/GDP ratio.  The onset of the current global liquidity crisis and the ensued deleveraging 
illustrated vividly the fragility of Korea’s balance-sheet.  During the first stage of the crisis, 
Korea’s reserves have dropped by roughly $60 billion in half a year, a decline of about 25%. 
Indeed, reserves were key to the bailout package that the Korean government unveiled in the 
second half of 2008. The center-piece of the package was a $100 billion three-year government 
guarantee for banks’ foreign debt. This sum was more than sufficient to cover Korean banks’ 
foreign debt maturing by June 2009, estimated by the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
to be about $80 billion.  Yet, observes noted that, despite the large hoarding of international 
reserves used to finance the bailout package, market concerns were not abated:   
 
 “Similar guarantees had failed to allay fears of financial meltdown at the beginning 
of the Asian crisis in 1997 and they failed again. As in 1997, the market reactions 
were indifferent. Only when Korea secured a swap line amounting to $30 billion 
from the Fed on October 30 the foreign exchange market settled down somewhat, 
but not very long. The foreign exchange rate shot up to 1,509 won per dollar three 
weeks after the swap had been announced, which was apparently not enough to 
remove uncertainties surrounding Korea’s ability to service its foreign debt. Korea 
also managed to arrange won-local currency swaps with the central banks of both 
China and Japan, each amounting to an equivalent of $30 billion on December 13. 
Only when it was made clear that the Fed would renew the swap agreement, foreign 
investors’ confidence in the Korean economy improved and stability in the foreign 
exchange market returned toward the end of the first quarter of 2009.”  
        
Yung Chul Park (2009) 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, financial integration added the need to self-insure against volatile financial flows.  By the 
nature of financial markets, the exposure to rapidly changing demands for foreign currency triggered by 
financial volatility exceeds the one triggered by trade volatility [see Aizenman and Lee (2007)].     
6 Indeed, observers raised questions about the growing costs of stockpiling these reserves, asserting that 
their level in emerging Asia exceeded the social optimum [see Jeanne and Ranciere (2005)].     6
Korea’s experience in the last five years illustrates the hazard of the absence of a pro-
active external debt management policy, and the limits of relying only on hoarding IR as the 
defense against a deleveraging crisis.  Looking beyond Korea, other EMs cushioned the 
adjustment to the global financial crisis by a combination of exchange rate depreciation and 
partial depletion of their IR.
7  However, after the first phase of the adjustment, Central Banks 
have been reluctant to further draw down their reserves.  Figure 2 portrays the IR dynamics 
during the first nine months of the crisis in Korea, India, Russia, Poland and Malaysia, July 08-
March 09, reporting the ratio of IR (US dollar) relative to their level in July 08.
8  Central banks 
used a share of their IR in first few quarters of the crisis to finance deleveraging pressures, 
thereby mitigating currency depreciation.  Yet, after losing not more than one-third of their initial 
stocks of IR, Korea, India, Russia and other EMs became more averse to further drawing down 
their IR.  The choice of the speed of drawing-down accumulated international reserves is a 
delicate one. It hinges, amongst other things, on the anticipated future course of the global 
economy, the domestic adjustment capacity and the degree of financial integration of the country 
in question. The trade-offs for a country like India differ from those of Chile. India is less 
integrated to the global financial system than Chile, and its government has less room for fiscal 
adjustment due to its significant and growing fiscal deficits.  Brazil, Chile and other EMs have 
preferred to adjust mostly through exchange rate depreciations. It is plausible that the latter 
group of EMs have been saving their IRs for leaner years to self-insure against potential 
prolonged periods of downward pressure on their terms of trade. 
Further insight about the ‘fear of losing IRs’ can be gained by looking at the differential 
patterns of using IRs during the crisis across all EMs.  Aizenman and Yi (2009) investigated the 
adjustment of 21 EMs during the window of the crisis, and found a mixed and complex picture.
 9  
                                                 
7 A bailout similar to the one in Korea was instrumented by the Bank of Russia.   The Russian bailout was 
implemented in context of intensified involvement of the Russian state in managing its vast natural 
resources, including a willingness to impose what amounted to de facto capital controls. Russia’s large 
stock of reserves before the crisis (exceeding $600 billion) had prevented a complete collapse of its 
banking system.   
8 The dominance of the US $ in the composition of reserves implies that most of these changes reflect IR 
outflows [due to data limitations, we are unable to control valuation effects]. 
9 The EMs’ sample is composed of the countries listed in the FTSE and MSCI emerging market list.  It 
did not include Singapore and Hong-Kong because of their special economic structure, specializing in 
entrepôt services.  In addition, due to the dramatic effect of the IMF’s aid on Hungary’s reserves changes,   7
Intriguingly, only about half of the EMs relied on depleting their international reserves as part of 
the adjustment mechanism. To gain further insight, we compared the pre-crisis IR/GDP ratio of 
countries that experienced sizable depletion of their IR, to that of countries that did not, and find 
different patterns between the two groups.  Trade related factors (trade openness, primary goods 
export ratio, especially large oil exports/all exports) seem to be more significant in accounting 
for the pre-crisis IR/GDP ratio of countries that experienced a sizable depletion of their IR in the 
first phase of the crisis. Our findings suggest that countries that internalized their large exposure 
to trade shocks before the crisis, used their IR as a buffer stock in the first phase of the crisis. 
Their IR losses followed an inverted logistical curve.  After a rapid initial depletion of reverses, 
within seven months they reached a markedly declining rate of IR depletion, losing not more 
than one-third of their pre crisis IR. In contrast, countries whose pre-crisis demand for IRs was 
more sensitive to financial factors, refrained from using IR, and preferred to adjust through 
currency depreciations.
10  
Prior to the crisis, observers viewed hoarding IR as reflecting several causes, including 
the “fear of floating” [Calvo and Reinhart (2002)]; and precautionary and/or mercantilist motives 
[Aizenman and Lee (2007)].  However, during the recent “flight to quality” and deleveraging 
observed in the first phase of the crisis, the “fear of losing IR” played a key role in shaping the 
actual use of IR by EMs.  This suggests that EMs’ adjustment was constrained more by their fear 
of losing international reserves than by their fear of floating.  A possible interpretation for the 
fear of losing IR is the apprehension of a country that reducing its IR/GDP ratio below the 
average of its reference group would increase its vulnerability to deleveraging and sudden stops 
[see Cheung and Qian (2009) for “keeping with Joneses” evidence dealing with East Asia].  
These factors also suggest greater demand for regional pooling arrangements and swap lines [see 
                                                                                                                                                             
it was excluded from the sample (Hungary’s IR had increased nearly by half in the two months after the 
IMF’s stabilization package was put in place).  The study also excluded Morocco and Pakistan due to 
unavailability of the relevant data. 
10 Intriguingly, the average exchange rate depreciation rate from 8-08 to 2-09 was about 30% in both EMs 
that depleted their IR and those that refrained from depleting IR.  A hypothesis that can explain this 
observation is that the shocks affecting the EMs that opted to deplete their IR were larger than the shocks 
impacting EMs that refrained from using their IR. Testing this possibility requires more data, not 
available presently, including the deleveraging pressures and balance sheet positions during the crisis. 
This hypothesis, if valid, implies that countries prefer to adjust to bad shocks first via exchange rate 
depreciation, supplementing the adjustment with partial depletion of their IR only when the shocks are 
deemed to be too large to be dealt with using only exchange rate adjustment.   8
Rajan et al. (2005) and Aizenman and Pasricha (2010)] as well as possible new roles of 
International Financial Institutions.   
The limited efficacy of the large stockpile of IR in preventing a run on well managed 
countries during a crisis calls into question the desirability of unfettered capital mobility.  While 
hoarding international reserves prevented a replay of the 1997-8 crisis dynamics in Korea, the 
large depreciation of the Koran Won renewed concerned about the exposure to balance sheet 
effects associated with depreciation.  At the limit, eliminating the balance sheet exposure may 
require hoarding dollar liquidity per dollar external liability, practically nullifying the gains from 
financial integration [Park (2009)].  We turn now to evaluate possible future developments of 
policies and financial mechanisms to deal with these concerns.    
 
2.        International reserves at times of global financial distress: reflections and 
assessment of future options. 
  A constructive way to evaluate the role of international reserves during the crisis is to 
apply the perspective of insurance mitigating exposure to risky activities.  The self-insurance 
benefits associated with international reserves can be understood using two benchmarks: no self-
insurance, and full self-insurance.  In the early 1990s Korea refrained from hoarding 
international reserves for self-insurance against sudden stops – Korea’s IR/GDP ratio was low 
(about 5%), similar to the IR/GDP ratios of OECD countries.  The low Korea’s IR/GDP ratio at 
that time reflected the presumption that by virtue of limited financial integration, a history of 
high growth and an impressive record of adjustments to adverse shocks, Korea was not exposed 
to sudden stop events.  The 1997-8 crisis vividly illustrated that Korea and all emerging markets 
embarking on financial integration are exposed to sudden stop events.  The 1997-8 crisis induced 
a regime switch wherein Korea’s IR/GDP ratio more than quintupled within less than ten years, 
reducing thereby the expected costs of possible sudden stops.  Similar massive hoarding of IR 
were observed for most Emerging Asia in the aftermath of the 1997-8 crisis, with Latin America 
and the Oil exporting countries joining the trend of hoarding IR in the early 2000s. 
With most insurance schemes, agents rarely get full insurance against the relevant hazard, 
as a typical insurance comes with loading factors, deductibles, moral hazard, and other 
constraining features.  Full insurance is frequently too costly to attain, and rarely observed.  This 
applies to personal hazard like health and car insurance, as well as to the macro self-insurance   9
services provided by hoarding international reserves.  Hence, with partial insurance, one should 
expect that the insurance would mitigate but not eliminate the adverse effects of the hazardous 
event.  In the context of financial integration, fully insuring against deleveraging may entail too 
costly hoarding, as at the limit the portfolio investment of foreign agents and the external 
borrowing of domestic agents should be matched by an equivalent level of international reserves.  
Such a scheme implies that the country is fully insured at too high a cost.  Yet, this argument 
does not negate the beneficial effects of self-insurance, because the alternative of no self-
insurance would be costly as well [see the East-Asian crisis].  Thus, the question facing the 
central bank is to find the optimal level of self-insurance.  
The theory of optimal insurance suggests that with hazards impacted by agents’ behavior, 
optimality calls for a mixture of partial insurance and preventive methods reducing the frequency 
and intensity of the calamity [installing fire alarm and external lights in a house, driving a car at 
a lower speed, equipping a car with air-bags, etc…].  This logic applies equally well to emerging 
markets’ exposure to sudden stops and deleveraging shocks, when a country may supplement 
hoarding international reserves with policies that would reduce its exposure to capital flight.  As 
was pointed out by Rodrik (2006), such policies may include proactive steps to reduce exposure 
to external debt.     
In the next section we outline the case of supplementing hoarding IR with a Pigovian tax 
scheme.  The logic of the scheme follows from the negative externalities associated with large 
inflows of capital.   Specifically, Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003), and the related 
balance sheet literature showed that external debt associated with maturity and currency 
mismatches increase the downside risk of costly sudden stops crises. Greater balance sheet 
exposure frequently entails higher real depreciation triggered by deleveraging, inducing greater 
distress of the domestic banking system, and ultimately higher expected forgone output costs of a 
sudden stop and deleveraging crisis.  As most agents are price takers, each ignores its marginal 
impact on increasing the expected cost of such a crisis.  This in turn entails a fire-scale 
externality akin to “congestion”, calling for a Pigovian tax scheme.   
 
2.1   Optimal hoarding of international reserves and a Pigovian tax-cum-subsidy scheme 
We construct a minimal model to explain the optimal self-insurance offered by 
international reserves in mitigating the output effects of liquidity shocks.  The structure of the   10
model is akin to that of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) -- investment in a long term project should 
be undertaken prior to the realization of a random liquidity shock.  Hence, the liquidity shock 
may force costly liquidation of the earlier investment, reducing second period output.  As our 
focus is on developing countries, we assume that all of the financial intermediation is done by 
banks, relying on a debt contract.  We simplify further by assuming that there is no separation 
between the bank and the entrepreneur – the entrepreneur is the bank owner, using it to finance 
the investment.  The time line is summarized in Figure 3.   
At the beginning of period 1 entrepreneurs fund investment by external borrowing D to 
finance planned second period capital,  2,p K , and banks’ reserves, R ;  2,p KD R =− .  At the end 
of period one, after the commitment of investment capital, a  Z materializes.  A fraction z of 
foreign lenders demands their deposits back, Z = zD.  Assuming away sovereign risk and 
bankruptcy constraints, the deleveraging shock is first met by selling reserves. Any excess of the 
liquidity shock zD above reserves R is met by pre-mature costly liquidation of  { } 0, MAX zD R − .  
The liquidation reduces the actual second period capital from  2,p K to  2 K , at a rate that depends 
on the adjustment cost, θ :  { } 22 , (1 ) , 0 p KK M A X Z R θ =− + − .  Premature liquidation implies 
that the impatient depositors get their money back without any interest payment.  Only patient 
depositors are paid interest rate ρ upon the realization of the investment. Final output is 
produced at period 2, according to a Cobb-Douglas production.  The second period output 
finances the repayment of outstanding debt left to maturity,  (1 )(1 ) Dz ρ − + .  Unused reserves 
hoarded in period 1,  { } ,0 MAX R Z − , provide the bank with a risk free return in the second 
period,  { } (1 ) , 0 f rM A XRZ +− .   
The second period output is:  
 
(1)  { } 22 , [( 1 ) , 0 ] p YK M A X Z R
α θ =− + − ;   where   1 0 < ≤θ , and  1 < α .   
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It is convenient to normalize the liquidity shock by the level of deposits, denoting the normalized 
liquidity shock by z: 
 
(3)  zD Z = ;   1 0 ≤ < ≤ τ z , associated with a probability density function ) (z f . 
 
Depositors are entitled to a real return of D r on the loan that remains deposited for the duration of 
investment.  Assuming risk neutrality, and that the agents’ subjective discount rate is ρ , 
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Net reserves held until period 2 are assumed to yield a return of  , ff rr ρ ≤ .
  Our model 
deals with a developing country, where balance sheet concerns frequently induces the authorities 
to resist depreciation due to the resultant costs.  In these circumstances, private banks’ reserves 
are frequently held and managed by the Central Bank, after being swapped with domestic 
currency.  Hence, the IR in our discussion are interchangeable with international reserves.  To 
simplify the analysis, we refrain from modeling other possible adjustments to deleveraging 
shocks, including sovereign default, massive real depreciation, and bankruptcies.
11 
We denote the marginal liquidity shock associated with liquidation by  D R z z / ,
* * = .   
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It is the sum of the expected output, plus the income associated with unused reserves (i.e., 
reserves net of liquidation), minus the repayment to depositors who get a return of ρ on the net 
                                                 
11 We assume that the social costs of sovereign default and bankruptcies are above the benefits [see 
Dooley (2000)].  Indeed, in the 2000s, most emerging markets (Argentina notwithstanding) refrained 
from exercising these options.  The resistance to appreciation in the face of transitory shocks is well 
documented [see Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007)].    12
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2.2    The competitive,  Laissez faire equilibrium 
The FOC determining the optimal demand for international reserves is 
(6)     
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This condition is equivalent to: 
 
(7) 
2, 2 [( 1 ) ] P r [ ] |
p Kf K MPr Z R E M P Z R θ ⎡ ⎤ −+ ⋅ < = > ⎣ ⎦,  
 
where  K MP is the marginal productivity of capital; Pr[ ] Z R <  the probability that the liquidity 






∫  for variable Y.  Optimal hoarding is reached when the expected opportunity cost of 
holding reserves (the LHS of (7)) equals the expected precautionary benefit of holding reserves 
(the RHS of (7)).  This benefit equals to the savings in liquidation cost achieved by extra dollar 
reserves, θ , times the expected marginal product of capital in states associated with liquidation.  
The first order condition characterizing optimal deposit is: 
 (8) 
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This condition is equivalent to:   13
 (9)       
[ ] [ ]
2, 2 Pr[ ] {1 (1 )}| (1 ) | (1 ) 1 ( )
p KK f MPZ R E M P z Z R r E z Z R E z θρ ⎡⎤ ⋅< + − + > = + ⋅ < + +− ⎣⎦ ,  
 
The LHS of (9) is the expected marginal product of borrowed funds: the sum of the expected 
marginal product of capital in states where reserves cover the liquidity shock (Z < R), plus the 
expected marginal product of capital net of liquidation cost in states where the liquidity shock 
exceeds reserves (Z > R).  The RHS of (9) is the expected cost of borrowing: the opportunity 
cost of marginal reserves funding deleveraging when Z < R (the first term) plus the expected 
marginal return on deposits held to maturity (the second term).   
 
2.3   Fire-sale congestion externalities and deleveraging. 
The discussion above focused on the perspective of the representative bank, which is 
assumed to be a price taker, viewing the adjustment cost given, as in Aizenman and Lee (2007).  
The bank ignores the fire-sale effect – bank’s attempt to liquidate capital tends to depress the 
selling price of capital facing all banks.  Aggregate liquidation requires each bank to liquidate 
more of its investment to fund a given deleveraging pressure, increasing thereby the liquidation 
cost, θ . Specifically, we assume that the liquidation cost, θ , depends positively on aggregate 
liquidation by n identical banks, LQ: 
 
  
(10) ( ), ' 0 LQ θ θθ => , [ *, 0] i LQ n DMax z z = ⋅− ,    
 
where  i D   is the liquidation of the representative bank. For a representative bank, 
* [, 0 ] ii LQ DMAX z z =− .  We denote by  ,i θ η  the elasticity of the liquidation cost with respect to 
the deleveraging by bank i, 










12   We assume a large enough number of 
                                                 
12 This paper extends the model in Aizenman and Lee (2007), where the adjustment cost θ was fixed. The 
present paper focuses on the case where the adjustment cost θ  is impacted by aggregate deleveraging.  
While each bank takes the adjustment cost as given, the actual adjustment cost increases with the macro 
deleveraging, leading to a fire-sale externality. We will derive shortly the implications of this externality 
on the central bank’s optimal policies.  The model follows the tradition of Bryant (1980) and of Diamond 
and Dybvig (1993) in that the source of liquidity shock lies with the lender, rather than the borrower   14
identical banks, n, so that the deleveraging elasticity of each bank is negligible.  Yet, the 
combined effect of all banks deleveraging,  ,i n θ η ⋅ , is sizable.  The gap between the negligible 
liquidation elasticity of each bank and the sizable macro deleveraging elasticity manifests itself 
in the fire-sale congestion externality.  The focus of our analysis is on the optimal tax-cum-
subsidy called to deal with this externality.   
The first order conditions for optimal hoarding and borrowing from the planner’s 
perspective are:    
 
(7a) 
2, 2 , [( 1 ) ] P r [ ] ( 1 ) |




2, 2 , Pr[ ] {1 (1 [1 ])}|
(1 ) | (1 ) 1 ( )
p KK i
f
MP Z R E MP z n Z R
rE z ZR E z
θ θη
ρ
⎡ ⎤ ⋅< + − + + ⋅ > = ⎣ ⎦
+⋅ <+ + −
.  
 
Comparing the FOCs pairs of the atomistic bank with the planner’s FOCs [(7) to (7a), and (9) to 
(9a), respectively] reveals that in states of deleveraging [i.e., when
* zz > ], the fire-sale 
externality increases the marginal social benefit of hoarding IR by 
2 ,ii K nM P θ η θ ⋅ , and reduces the 
marginal social benefit of borrowing by 
2 ,ii K nz M P θ η θ ⋅ . 
 
2.4  Policies supporting the optimal allocation 
The welfare consequences of fire-sale externality may be alleviated by taxing foreign 
borrowing at a rate t, and possibly subsidizing hoarding international reserves at a rate s.  We 
assume that the tax revenue is yielding the risk free interest rate.  The introduction of these 
policies modifies the bank’s problem to    
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998). However, we refrain from modeling the process that leads to lenders’ 
deleveraging. Abstracting from the question whether market-based liquidity insurance is available, we 
focus on the implication of large adjustment cost on the demand for reserves as self-insurance. That cost 
includes, but is not restricted to, the liquidation cost. In a similar vein, no distinction is made between the 







(1 *) ( ) (1 [ *]) ( )





E D tz f z d z tz zz f z d z







Π= −− + −− − − + ⎢⎥
⎣⎦
⎡⎤





The optimization of (11) provides bank’s FOC for optimal hoarding reserves and borrowing: 
 
(7b) 
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The social planner’s objective,  p V , is to maximize the expected utility of the representative bank 
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The planner’s FOCs determining the optimal hoarding and borrowing are, respectively 
 
(7c) 
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Case a: Borrowing tax policy 
  Suppose first that the policy maker sets the borrowing tax at a rate that induces the bank 
to internalize the fire-sale externality.  Comparing (9b) and (9c), while setting s = 0, we find the 
optimal tax needed to induce banks to internalize the borrowing externality:  
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The tax equals the externality [ ,i n θ θ η ⋅ ], times the expected cost of deleveraging pressure when    
Z > R, measured in terms of the marginal productivity of capital (i.e., 
2 | K E zMP Z R ⎡ ⎤ > ⎣ ⎦ ). 
 
Case b: Borrowing tax-cum-hoarding IR policy 
The borrowing tax policy stated in (13) may fall short of inducing the optimal demand for 
international reserves.  Achieving optimal borrowing and hoarding reserves requires two policy 
instruments -- an external borrowing tax and an international reserves subsidy.  We infer the 
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It can be shown that the net tax revenue collected by the authorities is positive:
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13  Note  that 
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The net tax revenue equals the product of the fire-sale externality [ ,i n θ θ η ⋅ ], times the 
expected liquidation costs in states where Z > R, 
2 ()| K E ZR M P ZR ⎡ ⎤ −> ⎣ ⎦.  While subsidizing 
hoarding IR is costly, equation (15) shows that the fiscal revenue from the borrowing tax exceeds 
the cost of funding the hoarding subsidy.  
Example: 
Further insight is gained by studying a simple example of a binomial distribution, where 
with probability  c p , the liquidity shock would be  c z : 
 













   
 
In these circumstances, the optimal tax-cum-subsidy (14) is reduced to  


























2, K c MP is the marginal product of capital when the liquidity shock is  c z .  We 
simulate this economy for the case where the probability of a liquidity crisis is relatively high, 
0.33 c p =   , and the liquidation pressure during the crisis is high,  0.75 c z =   .  The other 
parameters are set to   0.75; 0.02; 0.07 f r α ρ === , and 
*3 * 0.15( )
aa a a zz f o r zz θ =− > , 
where 
* ,
aa zz denote the economy wide averages 
* , zz, respectively.
14  Simulating this case we 
found that the optimal borrowing tax is about 0.6%, the reserves subsidy is about 1.3%, and the 
                                                 
14 Note that the fire-sale discount is determined by θ .  Empirical studies suggest that the ‘fire-sales 
discount’ ranges between 10% (equities) and 15% (real estate) [see Coval and Stafford (2007), 
Pennington-Cross (2006) and Clauretie
 and Daneshvary (2009)].   
The specification 
*3 0.15( )
aa zz θ =− for 
* aa zz >  reflects the assumption that the fire-sale discount is 
zero in the absence of liquidation pressure (
* aa zz < ), approaching 0.15 with total liquidation [i.e., as 
* () 1
aa zz −→ ], and a macro fire-sale elasticity of 3 (i.e.,  ,i n θ η  = 0.3).      18
optimal reserves/deposit ratio is about 1/3, well above the Laissez faire reserves/deposit ratio of 
1/5.  The welfare gain of optimal policies is about 1.3% of the Laissez faire surplus.  This 
simulation illustrates the underestimation of the precautionary benefits of reserves in the 
presence of fire-sale externalities.  The magnitude of optimal policies and the welfare gain of 
these policies reflect the assumption of a sizable probability of a liquidity shock -- the optimal 
policies and the welfare gain approach zero as  0 c p → .    
Figure 4 summarizes this discussion. It plots the expected marginal productivity of 
investment funded by external borrowing, drawn for a given level of international reserves.   
Curve 
PR
D EMP  corresponds to the conditions facing the atomistic entrepreneur, in the absence of 
borrowing taxes.  The debt threshold level D   is the lowest external debt that induces liquidation 
[defined by / DI R τ =  ].  A further increase in external debt increases the expected cost of 
liquidation.  In the absence of tax-subsidy policies, external borrowing is given by 0 D .  Curve 
SO
D EMP  is the expected social marginal benefit of borrowed funds.   It coincides with 
PR
D EMP  as 
long as the probability of costly liquidation is zero (for D <D  ).   For DD <  , the planner’s 
curve
SO
D EMP   is below the entrepreneur’s curve (
PR
D EMP  > 
SO
D EMP ), because it takes into 
account the negative fire-sale externality associated with marginal borrowing.  For the given 
initial IR, the optimal external borrowing isD

, well below 0 D .  The fire-sale externality is given 
by the dotted line, CE (proportionate to  ,i n θ θ η ).   The optimal borrowing tax is defined by that 
externality, shifting curve 
PR
D EMP   downwards.  Note that Figure 4 is a partial equilibrium 
treatment, drawn for a given level of international reserves.  A similar figure can be drawn for 
the bank’s and the planner’s demands for IR.  In comparison to the initial, no borrowing tax 
equilibrium, the impact of policies is to reduce the distorted activity (external borrowing), 
thereby inducing the borrowers to co-finance the precautionary hoarding of international reserves 
by means of the borrowing tax.
15  
 
                                                 
15 To simplify, this paper views the liquidity shock leading to deleveraging as an exogenous foreign 
disturbance.  Yet, some of the liquidity shocks may reflect instability associated with multiple-equilibria, 
stemming either from domestic or foreign vulnerabilities. The results of our paper continue to apply in the 
presence of multiple-equilibria as long as the susceptibility to multiple-equilibria increases with balance 
sheet imbalances.     19
 
3. Discussion 
The external borrowing-tax-cum-IR-subsidy outlined in our paper may mitigate the 
concerns about the costly hoarding of large a stockpile of IR needed to self insure against 
deleveraging crisis.  A challenge associated with the tax-cum-subsidy scheme is the dynamic 
nature of the optimal policies – the tax and the subsidy rate should vary with the external 
borrowing/GDP ratio, and with other factors impacting the risk of deleveraging crises.
16,
 17  The 
unfolding crisis of 2008-9 may be a watershed of financial globalization.  Emerging markets that 
embraced rapid financial integration before the crisis found that they are overly exposed to 
deleveraging propagated from the US.  The current crisis vividly illustrates that even a large 
stock of IR may not provide efficient self-insurance against deleveraging.  In this paper we 
outline a tax-cum-subsidy policy dealing with fire-sale externalities associated with deleveraging 
risks.  Our hope is that such a scheme would alleviate concerns about the cost and the efficacy of 
hoarding IR, thereby preventing the execution of more drastic policies that may further curtail 
financial integration.
18  
In the absence of a deep reform of the global financial architecture, emerging markets 
remain exposed to sudden stops and deleveraging crises, and the proper management of the 
external debt of a country remains a key challenge.  While moving to financial autarky is overkill, 
the proposed external borrowing tax-cum-reserves hoarding-subsidy would facilitate a more 
sustainable financial integration.  By now, the fastest growing countries in Asia (China and India) 
are applying versions of taxes on inflows of funds, policies that implicitly subsidize the costs of 
the sizable IR stocks held by these countries.  These policies reduced their exposure to the 
                                                 
16 See Kletzer (1984) for a model of possible inefficiencies associated with sovereign risk, and Levy 
Yeyati (2008) for the moral hazard challenge associated with the centralized reserve accumulation 
managed by the central bank in a dollarized economy.   
17 The design of the FDIC deposit insurance scheme in the US may be viewed as generating similar 
outcomes as the tax-cum-subsidy scheme outlined in this paper.  The FDIC charges insurance premiums 
on bank deposits at a rate that ideally should reflect the riskiness of banks’ investments.  The insurance 
premium is akin to a tax on banks’ borrowing.  The provision of insurance by the FDIC acts in ways 
similar to subsidizing hoarding liquid resources to provide self-insurance. 
18  The proposed scheme may also mitigate the political demand in Emerging Markets to spend the 
accumulated reserves to finance various expenditures.  Taxing external borrowing would scale down the 
needed reserves, and fund the accumulation of reserves by the activities that expose the economy to the 
need to self-insure by these reserves.    20
delivering crisis of 2008-9, and may reduce the costs of the renewed inflows of hot money. 
Alternatives to massive hoarding reserves include a deeper use of swap lines and of IR pooling 
arrangements; and channeling the reserves into potentially higher yielding but riskier assets, 
managed by Sovereign Wealth Funds.  While potentially useful, these alternatives are not a 
panacea.  Swap lines are typically of short duration, and are limited by moral hazard 
considerations.  Diversification by means of Sovereign Wealth Funds exposes the economy to 
the risk that the value of the fund may collapse precisely at the time that hard currency is needed 
to fund deleveraging, as has been the case during the 2008-9 global liquidity-crisis.   
The resumption of financial inflows to the EMs and the hoarding of international reserves 
may provide the illusion that ‘all is well.’  Though the crisis of 2008-9 vividly illustrated that 
hoarding IR remains a potent self-insurance mechanism, it is rather expensive and less efficient 
in the absence of assertive external debt management policies.  The growing gap between the 
interest rates in EMs and the US in 2009-2010 led to large financial inflows to EMs in search of 
higher yields.  Numerous EMs reacted by imposing ‘soft capital controls.’  These controls may 
reflect the policy makers’ aversion to potentially destabilizing short-term capital inflows, 
elaborated in this paper and by the literature dealing with financial integration in the aftermath of 
the 2008-9 global crisis [See Ostry et al. (2010) and the references therein, and the call of 
Caballero (2010) for a temporary use of a dual exchange rate].      
   21
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(c) IR/GDP and External Debt/GDP   
 
The data cover through mid-2008, before the global liquidity crunch. FEP = foreigners’ equity position based on 
market value of foreigners’ shareholdings.  SED = short-term external debt, TED = total external debt.   24
Figure 2 
 
International reserves and the deleveraging crisis, 8-08 to 3-09,  
 
 
Selected EMs:  Korea, India, Russia, Poland and Malaysia  
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Figure 3 








Beginning of period 1: 
External borrowing D, financing planed investment and hoarding 
reserves 
  2,p KD R = −   .   
End of period 1: 
Liquidity shock Z = zD materializes, reducing the net capital to 2 K ; 
{ } 22 , (1 ) 0, p KK M A Xz D R θ =− + − . 
Period 2: 
Output  2 Y  materializes,  22 () YA K
α = ; 
Depositors are paid  (1 )(1 ) Dz ρ − + ;  
Net reserves yield [( )(1 );0] f MAX R Z r − + .   26
Figure 4 
Sudden stop and external borrowing: the case of congestion externality and optimal 
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